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The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and
stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of
the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of
curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and
berries, and pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands.1
*
J.D. expected, 2019, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the
University of Montana; B.A. in History, 2007, Yale University. This piece grew out
of my application Case Note for the Public Land & Resources Law Review, in which
I was able to combine my longstanding passion for fishing and fisheries with
developing interests in Environmental and Indian Law via a truly remarkable case.
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear that case at the beginning of 2018, I was
thrilled to be offered a chance to further analyze the dispute and its underlying
issues. I would like to thank Professors Michelle Bryan, Monte Mills, and Hillary
Wandler of the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana;
the amazing editors and staff of the Public Land & Resources Law Review,
especially Jonah Brown, Sarah Danno, and Ben Almy; and my dad, who sparked my
love for the beauty of salmonids and the waters they inhabit.
1.
Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc. art. 3, Dec. 26, 1854, 10
Stat. 1132.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Isaac Stevens, Superintendent of Indian Affairs and Governor of
Washington Territory from 1853 to 1857, negotiated a series of treaties
with Pacific Northwest Indian tribes, especially during 1854 and 1855.
Through the Stevens Treaties (Treaties), regional tribes granted significant
swaths of their historic lands to the United States, particularly in presentday Washington State (Washington or the State) , in exchange for limited
land reservations and protections of traditional fishing rights, both on and
off the reservations.2 Language conveying those reserved rights (the
Fishing Clause), excerpted above, remained largely identical across all
Treaties.3 While short and consistent, the Fishing Clause has been
controversial from the start. For more than a century it has sparked
conflicts over fishing privileges, government duties, and treaty
interpretation.4
When the Treaties were signed, massive regional salmon
populations––often considered endless––were central to Pacific
Northwest tribal life, important for not only sustenance but also commerce
and culture.5 Salmon are anadromous fish, meaning they mature and
spend most of their adult lives in the ocean but return to freshwater streams
in their historic ranges to spawn.6 As highways spread across Washington
during the twentieth century, culverts were installed so streams could pass
under roads.7 Those passages earned the moniker “barrier culverts”
because while allowing water to flow through, they often prevent mature
salmon from moving upstream to spawn or juvenile salmon (smolt) from
moving seaward to grow.8 Combined with factors like commercial

2.
(emphasis added).
3.
4.
5.
Wash. 2013).
6.
7.
8.

United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2016)
Id.
Id.
United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1001 (W.D.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 845.
Id.
Id.
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overharvest and dam construction, culverts directly contributed to
precipitous salmon stock declines over the past 150 years.9
In 2001, twenty-one Tribes (the Tribes) filed a Request for
Determination in federal district court alleging Washington had violated
and continued to violate Treaty fishing rights by inhibiting salmon
movement throughout vital freshwater habitat.10 That 2001 Request for
Determination was not a new case, but rather another chapter in litigation
that began in 1970 when the United States, pursuant to its trust obligation
and hoping to end a century of conflict, first sued Washington on behalf
of the Tribes.11 That first decision enabled either side to “invoke the
continuing jurisdiction of the district court to resolve disputes ‘concerning
the subject matter of [that] case’” by filing a Request for Determination
with the clerk of court laying out relevant facts and the resolution sought.12
The long-running legal battle experienced another wait after the
2001 Request until, in 2007, the district court directly attributed decreased
salmon populations to barrier culvert propagation.13 The court thus held
the State was in violation of its obligation under the Treaties, particularly
the Fishing Clause, though it took another six years before the court issued
an injunction forcing Washington to start fixing the harmful culverts.14
Washington subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which in a June 2016 decision affirmed both the district court’s decision
and propriety of its injunction.15 Approximately a year later, in August
9.
Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1002, 1013.
10.
Request for Determination, U.S. v. Washington, Civ. No. C709213
(W.D. Wash. 2001). The Tribes included the Suquamish Indian Tribe, Jamestown
S’Klallam, Lower Elwha Band of Klallams, Port Gamble Clallam, Nisqually Indian
Tribe, Nooksack Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle Tribe, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Squaxin Island
Tribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, Upper Skagit Tribe, Tulalip Tribes, Lummi Indian Nation,
Quinault Indian Nation, Puyallup Tribe, Hoh Tribe, Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakama Indian Nation, Quileute Indian Tribe, Makah Indian Tribe, Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community, and Muckleshoot Indian Tribe.
11.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 845 (citing United States v. State of
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 327–28 (W.D. Wash. 1974)) [hereinafter Washington
I].
12.
Id. at 847 (citing Washington I., 384 F. Supp. at 419).
13.
Id. at 841.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 841, 849–65.
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2017, Washington filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted on
January 12, 2018.16 The United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in this case on April 18, 2018.
II. EARLY TREATY YEARS AND ORIGINS OF CONFLICT
Stevens Treaties have inspired more than a century of litigation,
but underlying conflicts date back even further, to the arrival of white
settlers in the Washington territory during the 1800s.17 By the late 1800s,
settlers blocked many of the Tribes’ traditional fishing sites on the Pacific
coast and Puget Sound, along with the Columbia River and its tributaries.18
Because regional Tribes were intensely reliant on vast salmon populations
for not only sustenance, but also cultural, religious, and economic life,
losing access to their fishing sites created dire hardships.19 The Fishing
Clause served to acknowledge and provide for the Tribes’ dependence on
fisheries; as Indians gave up land, they needed to retain rights to traditional
fishing sites and their salmon harvests.20
Despite the Treaties, most Tribes found both access to fishi A
duty to protect salmon populations and habitat ng sites and the volume
of fish available severely restricted by the turn of the 20th century. 21
Related litigation, a case called United States v Winans, first reached the
United States Supreme Court around that same time in 1905.22 In Winans,
the Yakima Tribe complained that two brothers completely barred Indians
from a traditional fishing site while using large mechanized fish wheels to
monopolize massive salmon harvests.23 The Court held that the Yakimas
were entitled to an easement across the Winans’ land allowing access to

16.
Pet. for Writ of Cert., Aug. 17, 2017, No. 17-269.
17.
Id. at 841–42.
18.
Id.
19.
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 665 (1979).
20.
Id. at 666.
21.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 842.
22.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
23.
Id. at 380.
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their “usual and accustomed” fishing site, and that the Treaty barred use
of mechanical fish wheels.24
In the century following Winans, the Tribes, State, and United
States regularly contested Treaty matters in court, particularly the Fishing
Clause.25 Washington’s state courts consistently read those as narrowly as
possible, minimizing tribal fishing rights while expanding State regulatory
powers and opportunities for commercial fishermen.26 Their rulings
largely reject tribal requests for access, licensing law exceptions, or any
type of state liability for drastic salmon population declines.27
For example, in the 1916 Washington Supreme Court case State
v. Towessnute, a Yakima Indian charged with fishing without a license off
his reservation defended that he had been fishing at one of his Tribe’s usual
and accustomed places.28 Under the Treaty, such actions were supposedly
protected; the United States Supreme Court in Winans had reinforced
tribal rights to traditional fishing grounds and even granted Indians
easements across non-Indian private property to usual and accustomed
fishing grounds.29 The Washington Supreme Court, on the other hand,
called the entire Treaty a “dubious document” and rejected the Indian’s
defense.30 While bound to the Winans holding granting Indians easements
to traditional fishing grounds, Washington’s Supreme Court held that the
State could simultaneously restrict Indian fishing rights through
regulation.31
24.
Id. at 383.
25.
See State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805 (Wash. 1916); State v. Alexis,
154 P. 810 (Wash. 1916); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919);
Washington v. Tulee, 109 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1941); and Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
618 (1942), among other related cases.
26.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 843–45.
27.
Id.
28.
Towessnute, 154 P. 805 at 805–06.
29.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
30.
Towessnute, 154 P. at 806.
31.
Id. at 809. The court relied on three main contentions, attempting
to tie all of them together in its holding. First, they alleged Washington had fewer
rights as a territory than as a state, meaning Stevens Treaties and the rights they
conferred on Indians lost significant weight when Washington achieved statehood.
Second, they called out the “Equal Footing” doctrine, which guaranteed states
admission to the union on the same political level as the original colonies. Finally,
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Subsequently, Washington steadily implemented policies via
legislation, ballot initiatives, and court decisions making it increasingly
difficult for Indians to fish at all, much less using traditional methods at
their usual and accustomed places.32 Washington constructed rules in
ways that favored mostly white, commercial fishermen harvesting salmon
from the ocean, while making it nearly impossible for Indians to
traditionally fish in freshwater rivers and streams.33 In 1907, for example,
the State banned all off-reservation fishing above the tide line unless done
by hook and line.34 Because Indians traditionally fished with traps and
nets, the prohibition effectively overruled the Fishing Clause.35
From voter initiatives banning traditional fishing gear to
aggressive expansion and enforcement of statewide licensing laws,
Washington continued attacking treaty-based fishing rights into the second
half of the twentieth century.36 By the 1960s and 70s, with Indians
essentially limited to fishing on reservations, Tribes began resisting via
“fish ins” and other protests dubbed “fish wars.”37 That proved the federal
government’s breaking point as well because in 1970, the United States
filed its first suit against Washington on behalf of the Tribes to defend the
Treaties and Fishing Clause.38 Nearly half a century later, that litigation
remains unsettled.
III. THE TRIBES TAKE ON THE STATE
The United States brought its initial 1970 federal case against the
State, alleging violations of the Treaties and Fishing Clause, in the
Western District of Washington.39 Given the number of parties and

they claimed the police power belonged to Washington, and that trumped the legal
power of any easement.
32.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 843–45.
33.
Id. at 843.
34.
Id. citing Wash. Sess. Laws, Ch. 247, § 2 (1907).
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 843–45.
37.
Id. at 844–45.
38.
Id. at 845.
39.
Id. (citing Washington I., 384 F. Supp. at 327–28).
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potential parties––particularly the various tribes––and a desire to avoid
more never-ending conflict, that court suggested:
that so far as possible all tribes, agencies or organizations
having or claiming direct or indirect justiciable interest in
treaty fishing rights in this judicial district be brought into
the case either as parties or as amicus curiae; and that
every issue of substantial direct or indirect significance to
the contentions of any party be raised and adjudicated in
this case.40
Judge Boldt hoped that by devoting time to joining parties,
isolating issues, and conducting research at the outset, the legal
proceedings would “at long last, thereby finally settle, either in this
decision or on appeal thereof, as many as possible of the divisive problems
of treaty right fishing which for so long have plagued all of the citizens of
this area, and still do.”41 While the Judge’s motivations were noble, the
case’s continued active presence in the judicial system more than forty
years later shows that they were largely for naught.
That first suit against Washington alleging violation of Stevens
Treaties and the Fishing Clause (again, “Washington I,” as briefly
discussed earlier) yielded what is popularly known as the “Boldt decision,”
which divided the case into two phases.42 In Phase I, Judge Boldt held the
Fishing Clause guaranteed the Tribes one half of the proportion of
annually harvestable fish. In Phase II, Judge Boldt held the fishing clause
also guaranteed the Tribes a “right to have the fishery habitat protected
from man-made despoliation.”43 The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated
Phase II, finding the harms allegedly violating Treaty fishing rights––
environmental despoliation and human-caused degradation of salmon
habitat––too vague.44 That court held:
40.
Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
41.
Id. at 330.
42.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 845–46.
43.
United States v. State, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
[hereinafter Washington II].
44.
United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) [hereinafter Washington III].
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the legal standards that will govern the State’s precise
obligations and duties under the treaty with respect to the
myriad State actions that may affect the environment of
the treaty area will depend for their definition and
articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute
in a particular case.45
Despite overturning a broad State environmental duty to protect
fisheries, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the State may still have
environmental obligations under the fishing clause of the Treaties; the
Tribes and the United States could potentially prevail in litigation over
such obligations, though they would have to point with greater specificity
at a discreet harm to salmon or habitat caused directly by State actions.46
The Tribes saw an opportunity to do just that in 2001 when they
filed a request for determination seeking “to enforce a duty upon the State
of Washington to refrain from constructing and maintaining culverts under
State roads that degrade fish habitat so that adult fish production is
reduced.”47 The United States joined that suit on behalf of the Tribes,
seeking a permanent injunction forcing Washington to “repair, retrofit,
maintain, or replace” culverts that “degrade appreciably” the passage of
fish within five years.48
Washington and its State agencies named as defendants argued the
Treaties did not convey any right to the Tribes regarding fish habitat, nor
did it establish a corresponding State duty to protect fish habitat.49 Next,
Washington alleged that because the targeted culverts diverted streams
underneath highways funded in part with federal money and approved by
federal agencies, it was justified in its belief that such culverts complied
with the Treaties (waiver defense).50 Third, Washington noted that the
United States also operated culverts impeding fish migration and that it
should not have to comply with Treaty duties if they did not also apply to
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1357.
Id.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 847.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id.
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the federal government.51 Finally, Washington counter-claimed the
United States violated its duty under the Treaties and filed an injunction
forcing replacement of its own problematic culverts.52
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
United States and the Tribes. Unlike in Washington III,53 here the United
States and Tribes demonstrated “concrete facts” showing that culverts
caused direct harm to the salmon fisheries statewide.54 Because the court
held that Washington had a duty to protect not only traditional tribal
fishing rights, but also the fish stocks and habitats enabling those rights to
be utilized for sustenance and commerce, it found discreet harm caused by
culverts, which were clearly the property and responsibility of the State.55
Seeking a solution, the district court held a bench trial in 2009 and
2010, after which the district court had to determine an appropriate
practical remedy––a challenging and time-consuming task.56 In 2013, the
district court finally issued both a Memorandum and Decision in favor of
the Tribes and a permanent injunction.57 The injunction, proposed by the
Tribes in 2010 before Judge Martinez signed off on it in 2013, gave
specific directions to Washington and its associated agencies as to how
they should deal with the culvert problem.58
Judge Martinez highlighted the myriad benefits of correcting these
issues in his Memorandum and Decision to support the injunction, stating,
“the public interest will not be disserved by an injunction. To the contrary,
it is in the public’s interest, as well as the Tribes’ to accelerate the pace of
barrier correction. All fishermen, not just tribal fishermen, would

51.
Id. at 848.
52.
Id.
53.
759 F.2d 1353.
54.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 848.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. See United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986 (W.D.
Wash. 2013) (compilation of major post-trial substantive orders) [hereinafter
Washington IV].
57.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 857. See Washington IV, 20 F. Supp. 3d
at 1000–25.
58.
Washington IV, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1023–25.
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benefit.”59 He also justified the need for the injunction by noting recent
developments and a desire for rapid action:
An injunction is necessary to ensure that the State will act
expeditiously in correcting the barrier culverts which
violate the Treaty Promises. The reduced effort by the
State over the past three years, resulting in a net increase
in the number of barrier culverts in the Case Area,
demonstrates that injunctive relief is required at this time
to remedy Treaty violations.60
Quoting Governor Stevens himself, who said, “I want that you
shall not simply have food and drink now but that you may have them
forever,” the court held that salmon stocks have declined precipitously in
recent decades, habitat degradation is a primary cause of that decline,
culverts contribute notably to habitat degradation, and the result to the
Tribes has been economic, cultural, and social harm.61 The accompanying
injunction directed the State to list all problem culverts and to correct those
within various timeframes.62
Washington appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals on several grounds. Most robust among those, it
objected to the district court’s interpretation of the Treaties, claiming those
imposed on it no duty related to barrier culverts. The State also objected
to the overruling of its waiver defense, alleging that the United States had
earlier opportunities to step in and either raise concerns about culvert
construction or stop it altogether.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1022.
Id. (emphasis added).
Washington, 827 F.3d at 848 (citing Washington IV at 1000-22).
Id. at 848–49 (citing Washington IV at 1023-25).
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 2016-2017 DECISION
A. A duty to protect salmon populations and habitat
In its appellate brief, Washington rejected a reading of the Treaties
that would impose upon it any sort of duty to protect fish habitat. It
claimed the language was clear and unambiguous, stating, “on its face, the
right of taking fish in common with all citizens does not include a right to
prevent the State from making land use decisions that could incidentally
impact fish.”63 The State advocated a reading of the Treaties based on
“plain language” and “historical interpretation,” in which they have no
duty involving fish habitat.64
The court disagreed with Washington’s analysis, calling their
view of the Treaties “misconstrue[d]” and “remarkably one-sided.”65
While Washington argued the principal purpose of the Treaties was to
facilitate white settlement of the Northwest, the court rejected that notion
entirely, instead holding their principal purpose was to ensure Indians
could support themselves. For Pacific Northwest Tribes, salmon were key
to survival. As early as Winans, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that “the right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was
a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which
there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed.”66
The Winans court finished evaluating this argument by noting that
even though in building and maintaining barrier culverts, Washington did
not act “for the primary purpose or object of affecting or regulating the
fish supply,” those actions still harmed the fishery.67 The court found that
Washington’s culverts directly resulted in a loss of roughly five million
square meters of salmon habitat, including 1,000 linear miles of streams,
63.
13-35519.
64.
35474, 13-35519.
65.
66.
67.

Brief of Appellant State of Wash., 27–-28, Oct. 7, 2013, 13-35474,
Id. at 27, Brief of Appellant State of Wash., 27, Oct. 7, 2013, 13Id. at 851–-52.
Winans, 198 U.S at 371, 381. (1905).
Washington, 827 F.3d at 853.
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and that salmon populations were currently not sufficient to provide for
the Tribes as promised by the Treaties.68 The court thus held Washington
had a duty under the Treaties regarding maintenance of salmon habitat,
and their use of barrier culverts violated that duty.69
B. The United States did not waive its ability to allege a Treaty violation
Washington’s second argument on appeal hinged on the United
States’ failure to contest a 1999 state “Forest and Fish Report,” in which
it addressed many issues regarding fish and roads.70 The State therefore
contended that the federal government, via the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and Federal Highway Administration, inferentially
approved the State’s proposed actions as not in violation of the Treaties.71
The Ninth Circuit assertively rejected this argument. While the
United States was a party in this action, the court noted they brought this
action on behalf of the Tribes and the rights at issue belonged to the Tribes
alone under the Treaties.72 Therefore, the United States’ actions or lack
thereof on Washington highway proposals had no bearing on infringement
of tribal Treaty rights. Only Congress may abrogate Treaties. Here, they
remain in full force.73
After rejecting all of the State’s attempted arguments against the
outcome of the 2009-10 bench trial and 2013 decision, on June 27, 2016,
a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court, further justified the injunctive relief, and denied any stay,
suggesting a major victory for the Tribes.74 While this opinion included
many notable elements, three in particular stood out. First, the panel not
only affirmed that the Treaties established valid off-reservation tribal
fishing rights “at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations,” and that

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853–854.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id. at 849–65.
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those remain in force today,75 but also recognized an implied guarantee of
sustainable fish populations in those traditional places:
The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed
fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow
the government to diminish or destroy the fish runs.
Governor Stevens did not make, and the Indians did not
understand him to make, such a cynical and disingenuous
promise. The Indians reasonably understood Governor
Stevens to promise not only that they would have access
to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but also that
there would be fish sufficient to sustain them.76
Second, the panel held Washington’s constructing hundreds of
barrier culverts blocking roughly 1,000 miles of salmon habitat a “concrete
fact” showing the State “acted affirmatively” by installing those culverts.77
Thus, even absent deliberate efforts to harm salmon, the panel still found
Washington in violation of its Treaty obligations via use of barrier
culverts.78
Finally, the panel rejected Washington’s claims that both
distinctions between federal and state actions combined with collaboration
between federal and state actors waived the Tribes’ complaint. The State
alleged that because the Washington State Department of Natural
Resources (WSDNR) consulted with federal authorities regarding
proposed fixes of fish habitat problems, ostensibly including barrier
culverts, the State could reasonably assume the National Marine Fisheries
Service had signed off on those proposals as reasonable under any federal
treaties.79 Washington supplemented this contention with two similar
points: first, that many state highways with barrier culverts were built
partly with federal funds, and second, federal administration of permitting
75.
Id. at 849 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979)).
76.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 851.
77.
Id. at 852–53.
78.
Id. at 853.
79.
Id. at 853–54.
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under the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act never raised red
flags about culvert problems.80 Responding to all of those, the panel
explained that federal-state interactions did not influence the validity of
the Treaties, that the Tribes had never acted in any way to give up their
treaty rights, and that the Tribes never authorized actions that would
substantially harm salmon stocks.81
On January 12, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted
Washington’s petition for certiorari in this case, adding yet another round
of arguments to this longstanding legal conflict.
V. FROM CIRCUIT TO SUPREME: EXHAUSTING REMEDIES AND
PETITIONING FOR CERTIORARI
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Final Word
On May 19, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued an order that 1) summarized the facts of the case and
previous decisions, using that to support its denial of both the petition for
panel and en banc rehearings; 2) provided a high-level overview, though
not an official dissent, explaining what it would take to legally overturn
the existing decisions, and 3) gave a brief commentary criticizing the
judges advocating for rehearings as perpetrating misconceptions about the
functionality of the appellate courts.
B. Denial of Rehearing Requests
In a circuit as large as the Ninth, its remarkably rare to get all
judges to agree on any one thing. Petitions for rehearing are no different
in that regard. Despite the judges’ collegiality and mutual respect, they
sometimes disagree on the proper outcome for a case. Hence, dissatisfied
parties can petition for a rehearing en banc even if they have lost at every
level until that point.82 Such rehearings are not guaranteed, however; in
the Ninth Circuit, a case must receive votes from a simple majority of non80.
Id. at 854–55.
81.
Id.
82.
Pub. Info. Office, Ninth Circuit En Banc Procedure Summary,
Media Advisory (U.S. Cts. for the Ninth Circuit, S.F., Cal.), February 10, 2017
(contact David Madden).
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recused judges to earn that privilege. Two unique considerations further
complicate this process: the vote results are anonymous, and senior judges
are not allowed to participate in the en banc proceedings unless they sat
on the case’s original three-judge panel.
C. Washington Petitions for Writ of Certiorari
By mid- 2017, having lost in front of Judge Martinez, Chief Judge
of the District Court for the Western District of Washington, failed to rally
any of Judges Fletcher, Gould, and Ezra of the Ninth Circuit Panel to their
cause, and struck out in advocating for a Ninth Circuit panel or en banc
rehearing, counsel for the State of Washington faced an unenviable
position. Despite everything, however, Washington determined to press
on, filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court on August 17, 2017.83 This launched a brand-new wave of
submissions, back-and-forth discussion, and argument over this same
topic, one of the many that has confounded not only lawyers, but also
politicians, tribal members, commercial and recreational anglers,
Washington residents, state engineers, wildlife biologists, and even
economists. Members of these groups are thus lining up as amici on either
side as this case affects them.
VI. BRIEFING BEFORE SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS
Washington’s Petition for Certiorari initiated preparation at the
Supreme Court level, and the docket steadily began to grow as the requisite
motions, responses, and replies, along with supplemental procedural
pieces, arrived from Washington (Petitioner) on the one side, and both the
Tribes and the United States (Respondents) on the other.84 After
Washington filed its petition, it took roughly four months for all requisite
elements to arrive; with the filing of Washington’s Reply To Briefs In
Opposition on December 11, 2017, the stage was set for review and
decision.85 Two days later, the collected materials were distributed to each
Justice, giving them slightly more than three weeks for review during one
83.
84.
85.

Pet. for Writ of Cert., Aug. 17, 2017, No. 17-269.
Docket, No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017.
Reply to Br. in Opp’n, Dec. 11, 2017, No. 17-269.
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of the busiest and most hectic seasons of the year before they would have
to officially take up the issue as a group, deciding its fate during one of the
Court’s regularly scheduled Friday conferences.
Against long odds, on January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court
granted Washington’s Petition for Certiorari.86 In the order announcing
that decision, the cert news was actually not even the headline; rather, it
was buried beneath an announcement that “[t]he motion of Modoc Point
Irrigation District, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae is
granted.”87 Both Petitioners and the lawyers at MODOC Point returned
home happy that evening.
A. Brief for the Petitioner: Washington Aims for a More Favorable
Outcome
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the United States v.
Washington case breathed new life into Defendant-Petitioners, their
counsel, and their supporters. While undoubtedly exciting for that group,
the result also meant that Washington would need to prepare and submit
new documents, most importantly their opening brief as petitioners,
explaining why all of the lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit, had
gotten this decision wrong. 88 Only six weeks after their petition was
granted, Washington submitted a 78-page Brief for the Petitioner on
February 24, 2018, laying out its case advocating reversal of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.89 Not simply repeating the arguments they made––and
which two federal courts had rejected––in earlier proceedings, Petitioners

86.
United States v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 735 (2012) (mem.);
October Term 2016: Statistics as of June 28, 2017, U.S. Sup. Ct.
J., Oct. 2016, at II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/Jnl16.pdf. While data
fluctuates from year to year, the chance of a Petition for Certiorari being granted in
any Supreme Court term tends to hoover right around 1%.
87.
Miscellaneous Order List: 583 U.S., U.S. Sup. Ct. Ord. List, Jan.
12,
2018, at
p.1,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
011218zr_3d9g.pdf.
88.
Pet’rs’ Br., Feb. 24, 2018, No. 17-269.
89.
Docket No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017.
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redirect their focus and substantially tweak their primary contentions from
how they were previously presented.90
First, regarding tribal rights under Stevens Treaties, the State
focuses almost exclusively on “[w]hether the treaty ‘right of taking fish,
at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all
citizens’ guaranteed ‘that the number of fish would always be sufficient to
provide a “moderate living” to the tribes.’”91 Compare this to the first
query Washington posed in materials for the Ninth Circuit, in which the
State questioned proper treaty interpretation on a much broader level and
contended that nothing in the Stevens Treaties prevented “incidental”
land-use decisions by the government that carried a mere possibility of
impacting fish populations.92
Next, Washington asserted that the Treaties’ plain language said
nothing about caring for salmon habitat, meaning they could never have
any obligations in that regard toward the affected tribes.93 This suggests
Petitioner expects the Supreme Court to be more receptive to this argument
than the Ninth Circuit Panel, which robustly rejected the argument.
Specifically, after ample discussion, the panel “conclude[d] that in
building and maintaining barrier culverts within the Case Area,
Washington has violated and is continuing to violate its obligation to the
Tribes under the Treaties.”94 It arrived at this determination by examining
how the Tribes would have understood the Treaties and Fishing Clause at
the time of their enactment, quoting the words of Isaac Stevens himself,
and perhaps most important for this setting, citing multiple relevant and
controlling Supreme Court holdings.95
The second and third questions presented provide arguments in
Washington’s favor not based on the Treaties or tribal rights. Question
two asks whether the federal government could legitimately require
culvert removal by Washington given that federal authorities entered into
90.
Pet’rs’ Br. at i, Feb. 24, 2018, No. 17-269.
91.
Id.
92.
Br. Appellant St. of Wash., at 27–28, Oct. 7, 2013, Nos. 13-35474,
13-35519.
93.
Id.
94.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added).
95.
Id. at 849–853 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-77; and
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381).
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Stevens treaties, and federal authorities also told the State to design its
culverts precisely in the way now being challenged.96 Again, a comparison
with prior proceedings provides interesting insights. In this case, though,
it is not the differences between earlier arguments and this one, but rather
the similarities that is curious. Petitioner made almost this exact same
claim, which seemed to be Washington’s weakest, in front of the Ninth
Circuit to no avail.97 As the Ninth Circuit explained, the federal
government’s actions toward Washington’s state government do not bear
on this litigation; the United States is a named party only inasmuch as it is
assisting with representation of tribes and tribal interests.98 At its root, this
case is between a consolidated group of Tribes and Washington State for
harms the latter allegedly caused the former. Even if the United States
somehow enabled or conspired with Washington to facilitate those harms,
it would not change the fact that Washington’s policies and actions are
those on trial here, not those of the federal government.99
Finally, Petitioner questions the actions of earlier courts in
evaluating and deciding on these matters. In particular, Washington
suggests the fixes they are required to undertake due to the district and
appellate decisions are both unfair, claiming they will not solve the alleged
problem but cost a great deal.100 This could wind up a fascinating
discussion point, particularly as it relates to the Fishing Vessel case.101 The
two sides take starkly opposing views on the precedent that case set, with
Washington contending that the “moderate living” standard of tribal fish
harvest was a maximum, while Respondents instead arguing it should be
a floor. Considering this litigation in a broader sense, this question could
reinforce one of the primary aspects of the Tribes’ complaints: fish
populations are nowhere near robust enough to provide a moderate living,
much less a minimal or barebones one, to those Tribes. That detail of
Fishing Vessel thus seems an odd, and possibly ill-advised, focus for
Washington in this situation.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Pet’rs’ Br. at i-ii, Feb. 28, 2018, No. 17-269.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 853–854.
Id.
Id.
Pet’rs’ Br. at i-ii, Feb. 28, 2018, No. 17-269.
Washington, 827 F.3d at 864-865.
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B. Briefs for the United States and Tribal Respondents: The Courts
Already Did Things Right
Counsel for the United States and Tribes faced a task far different
from those representing Washington in this appeal. Lawyers for both
respondents need not convince the Supreme Court of errors or oversights,
neither must they determine what about their case failed to win over those
preceding judges. 102 Moreover, as respondents they have the luxury of
having seen Petitioners’ brief in advance of finalizing their own, enabling
them to directly address anything surprising or compelling. Overall, these
briefs seek to clearly and compellingly show that “[t]he courts below
properly concluded that the Stevens Treaties prohibit the State from
imposing obstructions that substantially degrade or destroy the Tribes’
traditional fisheries.”103 The Tribes echo that exact same sentiment to
open their argument, but in greater detail and shorter chunks:
Barrier culverts cut off salmon from places where the
Tribes have the right to take fish. They also prevent
salmon from returning from the ocean to reproduce,
substantially degrading the tribal fishery. For both
reasons, the district court correctly held that Washington
has violated the Treaties. And the court properly exercised
its discretion to remedy that violation through an order
that gives the State both time and flexibility to fix the
problem.104
Like Washington’s brief, both the United States and Tribes open
with relevant historical background––the United States’ brief’s first
sentence takes the reader all the way back to the Lewis and Clark
Expedition and Louisiana Purchase105––and an overview of prior
proceedings, which are quite extensive in these particular circumstances.
102.
U.S. Br., March 26, 2018, No. 17-269; Resp’ts’ Br., March 26,
2018, No. 17-269.
103.
U.S. Br. at 15, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
104.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 23, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
105.
U.S. Br. at 2, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.

272

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 39

The Tribes do not reach quite as far back in their brief, instead first
focusing on the Stevens Treaties, particularly the fishing rights they
secured to regional Tribes and the current insecurity of those rights.106
Finally, the “moderate living” idea or issue, which Washington
paid particular attention to in its own brief, receives considerable
corresponding discussion in both respondents’ briefs.
Reading
Washington’s commentary in isolation could convince a clerk or justice
that the Ninth Circuit had at least somewhat erred in its opinion by
misconstruing the “moderate living” standard and how it applied in these
circumstances. Counsel representing the Tribes and authoring their brief
thus strongly refute that idea:
[T]he State devotes its brief entirely to challenging the
Ninth Circuit’s supposed recognition of a “new right” for
the Tribes to demand a “moderate living” from fishing. It
is undisputed that the Tribes are not earning a moderate
living from the fishery, but that is not the basis of the
Tribes’ claim. Indeed, the circuit judges on the panel
rejected Washington’s reading of their decision,
explaining that the panel did “not hold that the Tribes are
entitled to enough salmon to provide a moderate living,
irrespective of the circumstances”; rather, the State is
liable under the Treaties because it “acted affirmatively to
build ... barrier culverts that block the passage of salmon,
with the consequence of substantially diminishing the
supply of harvestable salmon.”107
Immediately after this explanation, the Tribes’ brief reminds
readers that disagreeing with the appellate court’s opinion would still not
adequately justify reversing its judgment.108

106.
107.

Resp’ts’ Br. at 1, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 24, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269 (internal citations

108.

Id.

omitted).
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Throughout these submitted documents, both the United States
and the Tribes consistently reiterate the major findings in their favor from
earlier decisions, particularly:
1) The “Right” described in the Fishing Clause of the Treaties as
“secured” does not grant Tribes any new rights, but instead protects
existing ones: not only the opportunity to fish, but also a guarantee of the
fishery’s continued health and existence. 109
2) Washington had violated and was still violating the Treaties,
simply through the ongoing presence and use of barrier culverts.110
3) The District Court did not buy Washington’s attempts to show
an equitable defense, largely by pointing to both interaction and lack
thereof between Federal and State authorities in various contexts. The
issue at hand in this line of cases is Washington’s violations of the
Treaties, not the federal government’s violations or even similar actions.111
C. Amici
Despite fairly limited media coverage, especially when this case
was granted certiorari, it is clear that people, groups, and even
governments across vast swaths of the country held some sort of interest
or stake in its outcome. 112 Significant numbers have demonstrated this by
seeking leave to file amici briefs on behalf of one side or the other, even
when the case was only being considered for Supreme Court review.113
Some of the most vested include: the American Forest & Paper
Association and National Mining Association; the Washington State
Association of Counties and Association of Washington Cities; Business,
Home Building, Real Estate, Farming and Municipal Organizations; the
Pacific Legal Foundation, the MODAC Point Irrigation District, and an
aggregation of states: Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Montana,
Nebraska, and Wyoming.114

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 25–26; U.S. Br. at 19–24, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
Id. at 38–44; U.S. Br. at 51–52, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
Id. at 49–52; U.S. Br. at 41–45, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269.
Docket No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017.
Id.
Id.
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VII. LOOKING FORWARD
Had this case been denied certiorari and ended with the 2016-17
Ninth Circuit Opinion, its outcome would have represented a clear victory
for the Tribes. Now, having been heard by the Supreme Court, the
conclusion is once more in flux. What impact may this decision have, both
in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere? That will depend how the vote
goes.
Option 1: The court splits 4–4. Justice Kennedy recused himself
quite late in these proceedings––less than a month before oral arguments–
–due to a conflict not caught during the normal screening process.115 If the
court splits down the middle as a result, the evenly-divided court would
affirm the most recent 2016-17 Ninth Circuit decision and injunction
without an opinion, precedential weight, or bar on future reconsideration.
Option 2: A majority of justices vote to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s
2016-17 decision. This would have the same immediate result as option
one, but with the addition of precedential value, a written opinion, and
possibly dissents and/or concurrences.
Option 3: A majority of justices vote to overturn some or all
aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s 2016-17 decision. This outcome probably
has the most mystery surrounding it, as the impact would heavily depend
on which part or parts of the Ninth Circuit decision the Supreme Court
overturns, along with what instructions the Supreme Court in terms of
precedential law and how it should be applied.
Under either Option 1 or 2, the current situation in Washington
will likely not change much, if at all. Notably, Washington is moving
forward with culvert fixes mandated under the Ninth Circuit decision and
injunction. While much work remains, at least some progress is being
made in replacing problematic culverts. Moreover, the Washington
Department of Transportation has updated project lists and cost estimates
accordingly and now maintains an informational website exclusively
providing information about these changes.116
115.
Letter from Clerk of Court Scott S. Harris to Noah G. Purcell,
William M. Jay, & Noel J. Francisco (March 23, 2018), in Re: No. 17-269, Washington
v. United States, et al.
116.
Improving Fish Passage, Wash. St. Dep’t of Transp.,
wsdot.wa.gov, https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Projects/FishPassage/default.htm
(last
visited, April 19, 2018).
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This decision could also pave the way for further cases regarding
degraded salmon habitat in the region. So long as Tribes isolate a concrete
action taken by target defendants and describe with specificity how that
action has negatively impacted salmon or their range, such complaints may
prevail in the courtroom based on this precedent. Because the Ninth
Circuit read the Treaties to include a duty on both Washington and the
United States to not only protect access to salmon via traditional fishing
methods and locations, but also ensure adequate populations of those
salmon, the Tribes could allege other infringements of the Treaties based
on that latter duty. For example, a logical next step may be for the Tribes
to challenge federally owned and managed culverts in the region,
something directly addressed in this decision. Alternatively, if Tribes
could identify a specific practice in Puget Sound or other coastal areas that
negatively impact salmon returns, they may be able to seek an injunction
on this precedent.
A related aspect of this result is the creation of a spectrum between
concrete, actionable environmental harms and undefined ones that cannot
be redressed via the Stevens Treaties. Standing in stark contrast to their
1985 Washington III decision, the Ninth Circuit here determines that the
use and maintenance of barrier culverts constitutes a particularized,
solvable treaty violation. What else could be a concrete, fixable harm?
Tribes could consider an even larger-scale run at this matter reminiscent
of Massachusetts v. EPA.117 The reason the Tribes triumphed here while
the Ninth Circuit vacated similar proceedings in 1985 is relatively simple:
specificity. The 1985 Court “held that the issue was too broad and varied
to be resolved in a general and undifferentiated fashion, and that the issue
of human-caused environmental degradation must be resolved in the
context of particularized disputes.”118 That begs the question, given
advances in climate and environmental science, what else may fit in that
category?
With modern understanding of climate change, particularly
science quantifying human impacts, could the Tribes now craft a
successful complaint alleging that climate change is infringing upon their
Treaty rights related to salmon? Provided they could identify and articulate
117.
118.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Washington, 827 F.3d at 846.
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“concrete facts” as to actions harming salmon or their habitat, supported
by scientific evidence, United States v. Washington suggests that Tribes
could triumph on an even larger scale, at least based on current
interpretation of these nearly-170-year-old treaties.

